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The Professional Reintegration of
the “Xiagang”
A survey in Liaoning province underscores the importance of vocational
training courses
Peilin Li and Yi Zhang
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from the French original by Nick Oates
1 For the majority of  forty and fifty-year-olds,  middle age is  synonymous with socio-
professional success and family stability. However, for some of them, this period is full
of regrets and distress.  In China, the generation encompassing 40 to 55-year-olds is
atypical because the journey they have taken to get to this age has been extremely
turbulent, marked as it has been by significant historical events; in particular, it was
this generation that was sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Today,
some of them are experiencing unemployment. In the former industrial regions where
labour problems are concentrated, the popular expression “the phenomenon of the 40
to 50-year-olds” (si wushi xianxiang) betrays the fact that age is a determining factor in
the difficulties encountered by these people in becoming professionally reintegrated,
precisely at a time in their lives when the burden they have to bear is heavy: financing
their  retirement,  medical  care,  the education of  their  children,  or  supporting their
parents.  Members  of  this  generation  ourselves,  although  belonging  to  a  privileged
group,  we  would  like  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  formulation  of  constructive
solutions in the face of this challenge.
2 For quite a long period and until the recent past, China adopted a policy of central
planning  in  labour,  which  led  to  a  situation  where  there  was  full  employment.
Eventually almost incomprehensible, the notion of unemployment fell into a kind of
collective black hole. From 1978, the year in which China launched into reforms that
partially  introduced  the  market  into  the  economy,  state-owned  enterprises  (SOE)
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experienced a decentralisation of their management. At the beginning, all social grades
drew concrete benefits from this, as everyone’s income increased, even though we were
witnessing  the  start  of  a  growth  in  inequality.  This  is  the  phenomenon known  by
economists under the term “Pareto improving reform”. However, the reform of the
state-owned enterprises based on a reinforcement of decentralisation made hardly any
progress, and the evolution of urban economic reforms was marked in particular by the
rapid development of the private economy. 
3 From  the  middle  of  the  1990s,  China  began  moving  towards  a  demand  economy
characterised by an increase in competition. The changes brought about by the market
in consumption brought with them an inevitable and far-reaching reconfiguration of
industrial  structures.  Under  the  combined  pressure  of  the  market  and  the
reorganisation of the industrial structures, the reform of the state-owned enterprises
thus  touched  on  the  sensitive  territory  of  job  security.  Very  rapidly,  the  excess
workforce at the state enterprises was “laid off” (xiagang). Today, while the majority of
the population continues to experience a rise in income, many xiagang workers face
material difficulties.
4 Between 1996 and 2000, 25 million people found themselves xiagang. In 2002, there were
another 14 million unemployed and xiagang, whose material difficulties had an impact
on several million families in the urban areas. The concept xiagang can be defined in the
following  way:  it  represents  a  kind  of  temporary  arrangement  of  a  social  security
system  borne  by  the  state-owned  enterprises  during  the  period  in  which  a  labour
market is created. This definition differs from that of unemployment1. Generally, the
economic situation of the xiagang is better than that of the unemployed2.
5 Although the  management  of  the  xiagang populations  has  been integrated into  the
reform  of  the  labour  market  since  2000,  it has  encountered  strong  resistance
particularly  in  the  towns  where  state-owned  enterprises  are  concentrated,  where
heavy industry is important, or even those where the natural resources are on the way
to being exhausted. From 2001, the central government has significantly increased its
subsidies in order to allow the management of the xiagang to be integrated with that of
the  unemployed  following  the  example  of  the  experimental  social  security  reform
implemented in the industrial province of Liaoning. In this province, 736,000 people
without employment were recorded between July 2001 and July 2002. The redundancy
settlement paid out amounted on average to 7,340 yuan. The implementation of this
new  policy  means  that  employees  who  lose  their  jobs  are  registered  directly  as
unemployed; this allowed the re-employment centres to be closed at the end of 2002
and  ensures  the  disappearance  of  the  term  xiagang.  However,  the  Chinese  labour
market will  remain strained for many years because of economic growth, industrial
restructuring, the increased density of capital and technology, as well as the conditions
of supply and demand on the labour market. Moreover, in the event of an external
shock to the economy, the groups less capable of becoming professionally reintegrated
are  the  ones  that  are  most  severely  affected.  Thus  recently,  SARS  (severe  acute
respiratory syndrome) resulted in a new loss of jobs among the unemployed who had
succeeded in reintegrating into the private sector, as well as in the temporary return to
the countryside of 8 million migrants.
The theoretical framework and the hypotheses 
6 Among the works that analyse the link between major historical events and the lives of
individuals, an important theoretical current reflects an interest in the consequences
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of  social  upheaval  on  individuals.  The  work  by  Glen  Elder,  Children  of  the  Great
Depression,  provides  one  reference3.  In  their  work  entitled  Children  of  the  Cultural
Revolution,  Zhou Xueguang and Hou Liren took up this hypothesis and applied it  to
China.  To  do  this,  they  used  questionnaires  to  conduct  surveys  in  an  attempt  to
measure  the  effects  of  the  policy  of  sending  educated  youths  to  the  countryside
(shangshan  xiaxiang)  during the  Cultural  Revolution on the  private  and professional
lives of the generation in question4.
7 In  our  own research,  we  take  the  opposite  route:  starting  from an  analysis  of  the
motivations and actions undertaken by individuals,  we will  attempt to measure the
possible  social  consequences  of  those  actions.  The  changes  brought  about  by  the
reforms aiming to introduce a market economy, and strong economic growth, mark a
new historical stage, in the course of which individuals and the social structure will
exercise a reciprocal action on each other. Individuals have increased their chances of
fighting to improve their fate by adapting their behaviour and their individual choices.
 
1. Statistics describing the xiagang interviewed (in %)
The impact of human capital on income
8 Human  capital  is  often  retained  as  one  of  the  most  significant  factors  explaining
income. Sociological research into social change has also demonstrated that, in parallel
with  industrial  development,  societies  evolve  towards  knowledge-based  and
information  societies  in  which  human  capital  becomes  more  and  more  important.
Following on from the theory of Nobel Prize economist Theodore W. Schultz on human
capital, countless studies have confirmed that, in a market economy where competition
is practised, there is a positive relationship between human capital and the income of
an  individual5.  Although  the  definitions  of  human  capital  used  by  the  different
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researchers  are  not  identical,  the  majority  of  them  rely  on  three  key  statistical
parameters:
9 the qualifications obtained or the number of years of schooling received
• length of professional experience 
• health.
10 Sociologists accord great importance to the level of education, classed within human
capital,  in order to analyse social structures and the changes in the social status of
individuals.  The  theoretical  models  developed in  this  field  demonstrate  empirically
that education level exerts a primordial influence on income levels and the possibilities
of climbing up the social ladder6.
11 In China, as a recent study reveals, the role of human capital as a factor explaining the
income of  individuals  has  expanded in the course of  the economic reforms7.  These
results  have  been  confirmed  by  another  study  focusing  on  education  level  and  its
impact on socio-economic status8.
12 However, our survey of the xiagang of former industrial cities reveals that the more
educated among them do not necessarily find work more easily, and even that their
new  salaries  are  no  higher  than  those  of  the  less  educated.  We  describe  this
phenomenon  as  the  “non-valorisation  of  human  capital”.  Its  appearance  can  be
explained by a variety of factors. It is probable that, in a period of transition towards
the market economy, the structural changes that ensue from that create an upheaval in
the norms usually applied to the field of know-how and technical skills, bringing with it
a kind of fracture in human capital, which thus does not necessarily exercise a positive
effect. The labour market that confronts new university graduates illustrates this well:
the differences in the levels of know-how and technical  skill  acquired at university
explains  the  differentials  in  remuneration.  Moreover,  Yakubovich  and  Kozian  have
shown  in  the  Russian  context  that  human  capital  acquired  in  the  framework  of  a
planned economy is rapidly devalued in a market economy9. Zhao Yandong arrives at
an identical conclusion in a study conducted in 2000 among the xiagang of the city of
Wuhan. Human capital measured by the standard of knowledge and the technological
level attained by the xiagang before they were laid off does not exert any influence on
the parameters of their new employment (salary, social value of the profession, degree
of satisfaction, etc.)10.
13 From the above, we can formulate a first hypothesis: in this period when the reference
standards based on know-how and technical skills undergo an upheaval, human capital
and remuneration level are not, in certain cases, correlated. This is particularly true for
the generation that had to interrupt its studies during the Cultural Revolution. 
Social identification
14 Social  identification is  a  complex phenomenon encompassing a  variety  of  elements
such  as  remuneration  level,  profession,  family  situation,  age,  sex,  and  so  on.  The
subjective evaluation made by an individual of his socio-professional status can thus
diverge widely from that produced objectively by his income level. Surveys have shown
that individuals tend to place themselves in the mean when they evaluate their socio-
professional status. At an identical income level, women have the tendency to position
themselves  with  an  inferior  status  to  men11.  It  is  precisely  the  existence  of  these
differences that gives research into social identification or class awareness a particular
importance,  as  there  is  often  a  close  causal  relationship  between  the  social
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identification of an individual and his or her behaviour or motivation to act. Between
the different social classes, the degree of uniformity in social behaviour is not identical,
however those subject to strong pressures tend to exhibit a higher degree of uniformity
in their behaviour. To adopt the terms used by Olson, social groups of a small size or
suffering strong pressures have a tendency to combine their efforts in order to achieve
the same objective12.
15 Empirical results tend to demonstrate that the relationship between human capital and
social identification is positive. Generally, in traditional societies inherited elements
such  as  the  family  or  social  identity  exert  a  predominant  influence  on  the  social
identification of an individual. But in modern societies, acquired dimensions, such as
education level  or type of employment,  play a more important role.  Thus Blau and
Duncan in “The American Occupational Structure” insist on the determining role of
education in the social identification of individuals13. Zhang Yinghua, Xue Chengtai and
Huang Yizhi underline that the higher the education level of a person, the higher his
own social identification14. Huang Yizhi arrives at the same conclusion with regard to
Taiwanese society15.
16 The social transformations that have appeared since the launch of the reforms in China
similarly show a progressive rise in the role of education in the social position of the
individual.  Nevertheless,  when surveying the factors  that  determine the perception
that the xiagang have of their social position, it appears that, within this social group,
the  “education level”  exerts  a  diminishing or  quasi  zero  explanatory  power.  While
being interviewed, the xiagang manifested a perception of their social position that was
fairly uniform and relatively high, but that was not linked to their education level.
These results contrast sharply with our surveys among migrant workers in urban areas,
which reveal that the higher a migrant is educated, the greater is his perception of his
social position16. One probable reason for this is that the incomes of the xiagang and of
the migrants have evolved differently: the incomes of the former follow a downward
trend, while those of the latter are rising.
17 Our second hypothesis follows on from that: for a group whose income is declining,
human capital loses its explanatory power in the perception that the individuals have
of their social position; furthermore, the more pronounced this downward trend, the
more marked the non-valorisation of human capital.
Unemployment among the xiagang and social stability
18 Numerous  studies  have  shown  that  an  increase  in  the  unemployment  rate  has  an
impact on social stability. Bo Yibo, in a study conducted shortly after the foundation of
the People’s Republic of China when the unemployment rate hit unprecedented levels
(1950-1952), asserts: “The economic crisis of the spring and summer of 1950 made life
difficult for private businesses and industries, and many were forced into bankruptcy.
Thus it was recorded in the 14 largest cities of the country that 2,945 factories closed
down.  At  the  same  time,  9,345  businesses  in  the  16  largest  cities  had  to  partially
suspend operations. This put several million people out of work, and their rancour was
perceptible, ‘despair and discontent spread rapidly among a section of the workers as
well as the poverty-stricken population of the cities’”17.
19 A link is frequently established between the unemployed or people without work and
criminality: “According to police statistics in Shanghai, Tianjin and Nanjing in a period
of  barely  one  year,  that  is  from July  1993  to  June  1994,  56.4% of  robberies,  fights,
rapes… in these cities were committed by young unemployed people or xiagang”18. Some
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researchers have even gone so far as to assert that the group representing the greatest
threat to social stability is not the least fortunate categories, that is the poor in the
cities or in the countryside, but most certainly the unemployed and the xiagang from
the state-owned enterprises. Their discontent is in fact the strongest as a result of the
deterioration, in both absolute and relative terms, in their social  condition19.  In his
works on the political opinions of destitute workers, Lipset champions the same point
of view: “The more a person lacks the experience and the feeling of stability, the more
he will be inclined to accept simplistic political opinions, not to comprehend divergent
opinions,  not  to  adhere  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  tolerance,  and  finally  to
support progressive ideas aiming at the reform the political system”20.
20 According  to  our  survey,  despite  a  strong  homogeneity  of  social  attitudes,  certain
differences among the xiagang are difficult to explain by their economic situation or
whether they are employed or unemployed. In fact, other works conducted in different
cities reveal that between 30% and 60% of xiagang exercise a paid activity. In the city of
Fushun, statistics from the labour office and from the social security office establish
that around 50% of xiagang have a new “stable” activity; 20% “do not have a stable
activity but often find work”; 10% “do not have a stable activity” and are frequently
without work; only 20% “have found nothing to do”.
21 Numerous works draw a link between an increase in human capital and a rational and
moderate  social  attitude.  Our  survey  shows,  in  contrast,  that  discontent  towards
society emerges more easily among the xiagang who have enjoyed a longer education
but who today have a low income level and low social recognition. The non-valorisation
of  human  capital  that  creates  a  fall  in  income  and  social  status  reinforces  the
discontent of this category of xiagang.  Our third hypothesis is:  for a social category
whose income is diminishing, the greater the loss of the explanatory power of human
capital in the development of income and social status, the more this category will be
dissatisfied with the current social situation.
Relationship between human capital and life plan
22 The social situation of an individual is conditioned by structural or political factors
independent  of  his  own  will,  but  he  possesses  room  to  manoeuvre  to  develop  his
personal future by relying in particular on his intellectual abilities, his perseverance or
his skill  in seizing opportunities.  In a society undergoing rapid development and in
transition  towards  a  market  economy,  this  freedom  to  manoeuvre  expands  in
proportion to  the ever  more important  place  afforded to  human capital.  In  such a
context, to avoid a rupture or a lack of valorisation of human capital, it is essential to
renew one’s knowledge. That being the case, training could allow the unemployed or
the xiagang to respond better to the needs of the market by reorienting their know-how
and their technical skills. Our fourth working hypothesis is that in a social group whose
income is falling, individuals who changed jobs or practised different occupations enjoy
greater success in moving to a new type of employment.
Statistical data and presentation of variablesSources of the statistical data
23 Our research was conducted between the end of August and the middle of September
2002 in four cities in Liaoning province which share similar characteristics: Fushun,
Benxi, Chaoyang and Fuxin. All four have a large xiagang population and face problems
involving  industrial  conversion  and  the  depletion  of  their  natural  resources.  The
surveys  were  carried  out  by  interviews  and  questionnaires.  The  interviews were
conducted at meetings bringing together members of government research centres,
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social security offices, planning committees, statistical bureaux, unions, the women’s
federation  and  district  committees.  They  were  also  conducted  during visits  to  the
homes of xiagang families whose situation appeared particularly difficult.
24 Our sampling for the questionnaires was designed in the following way. First of all, we
decided  that  each  city  constituted  a  distinct  sample.  Then,  we  wanted  to  avoid
standardising the responses through sampling based on a unit that would have been
formed by the enterprise. To do this, we randomly selected some 40 districts, on the
basis of lists provided by the administration, in which we picked, again at random, six
to seven xiagang workers to reply to our questionnaires. In total, we interviewed 1,110
workers, and 995 questionnaires were validated (90%)21.
The variables
25 The principal independent or explanatory variables are: education level (measured by
the number of years of study, the qualification obtained or the level of technical skill),
age, membership or not of the Communist Party, sex, number of paid working hours.
26 The  dependent  or  explained  variables  are  as  follows:  the  income  preceding
redundancy, the income declared by the xiagang when he finds new employment, social
identification  (perception  of  his  own  social  position),  degree  of  social  instability.
Variables such as “social identification” and “degree of social instability” are subjective
and are derived from personal opinions. “Class identification” is measured by a scale
incorporating six categories in relation to which the interviewee positions himself22.
The  degree  of  “social  stability”  is  a  subjective  appreciation  on  the  part  of  the
interviewee,  it  depends  on  elements  such  as  “attitude  with  regard  to  the  use  of
collective  petitions”,  “evaluation  of  the  degree  of  social  justice”,  “evaluation  of
relations  between  managers  and  the  masses”,  “perception  of  the  degree  of  local
economic  prosperity”,  “perception  of  the  period  for  resolving  the  problem  of
unemployment”.
Research and resultsHuman capital in the determination of income
27 The income of an employee depends on a multiplicity of factors. At the collective level,
it is the result, for example, of differences between enterprises and between business
sectors. At the individual level, it is determined by the job, years of service, the amount
of overtime worked, and so on. Our research focuses on the impact of human capital on
the  remuneration  level.  This  comes  down  to  asking  the  following  question  in  the
specific case of the xiagang: what is the impact of the accumulated human capital on
income before and after redundancy?
28 Table  2  presents  the  influence  exerted  by  human  capital  on  the  income  of  the
interviewees. The independent variables “sex” and “membership or not of the Party”
are highly significant both before and after the period of redundancy. Men earn more
than women, and members of the Party earn more than non-members; these results
have also been demonstrated in other surveys23.
29 Model 124 shows that the education variable has a significant influence on the monthly
salary before redundancy. The greater the importance attached to the number of years
of education, the more significant the accumulated human capital and the higher the
monthly salary before redundancy25. In this first model, the age variable also exerts a
significant influence: the older the individual,  the higher the monthly salary before
redundancy.  In the state-owned enterprises,  age is  equivalent to years of  service,  a
determining factor in the importance of the subsidy and the level of social benefits
provided by the enterprise26. If the level of technical skill does not make an important
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contribution to increasing the income of employees at an intermediate or beginner
level,  it  is,  however,  not  without  significance.  Workers  who possess  technical  skills
benefit from a higher income than employees without any specific training. 
30 If the number of years of education received, age and the level of technical skill are
considered as elements that make up human capital, the income of an employee before
redundancy  is  appropriate  to  his  human capital:  the  higher  this  is,  the  higher  his
remuneration will be. 
 
2. Income of xiagang
NB: The asterisks indicate the degree of signiﬁcance, with three asterisks corresponding to the
maximum degree (*** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; *P<0.05). 
The results were obtained using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model.
(1) Reference group: primary school and beyond.
(2) Reference group: other personnel.
(3) Reference group: no grade.
Under the heading “professional situation prior to lay-off”, the reference group “other personnel”
includes the personnel in administration and the public utility companies afﬁliated to the enterprise.
31 However,  in Model 2 of Table 2,  when the explained variable becomes the monthly
salary after redundancy (the last salary of the current employment), the results differ
radically. First of all,  the education variable ceases to have an influence on income.
Furthermore, the age variable has a negative impact on income: the older an individual,
the lower his new income. These results are thus different from those of the preceding
model.
32 With the aim of detailing in more depth the results of Model 2, which seems to confirm
the hypothesis that human capital and age have a negative effect on the new income
following redundancy, we tested two other models (3 and 4) which focus on the 20 to 40
and 41 to 55 age brackets. Model 3 allows the assertion that for xiagang between 20 and
40 years old, the variables such as education level or professional skill as well as age
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have lost their explanatory power as far as income following redundancy is concerned.
It  is  exclusively  the  personnel  who  worked  in  management  whose  professional
situation  before  redundancy  continues  to  play  a  positive  role.  Overall,  the  human
capital  of  the  xiagang loses  its  explanatory  power  in  terms  of  income  following
redundancy.
33 For Model 4,  the two independent variables represented by sex and membership or
non-membership of the party, highly significant in Model 3, also lose their explanatory
power for xiagang in the 41 to 55 age bracket, who had to interrupt their studies as a
result of the policy of “sending people down to the countryside” during the Cultural
Revolution. There is no statistical correlation between income following redundancy
and the  gender  of  the  individual  or  membership  or  non-membership  of  the  Party.
Furthermore, the holding of a diploma of higher technical proficiency has a negative
influence  on  the  income level  following  redundancy,  given  that  the  xiagang of  the
secondary sector possessing a technical diploma generally have an income in their new
job that is lower than that they could obtain in the services sector.
34 This acknowledgement reminds us of the words of a former model worker, aged 49,
from Jilin province, who was interviewed in Changchun in 1999: “For a very long time
after  I  was  made  a  xiagang,  I  could  not  find  any  work.  The  first  few  days  were
particularly hard. I slept one week solid. My wife is almost handicapped and has no
chance of finding a job. We were employed in a porcelain factory where the production
lines are specialised, I had no experience of working in other enterprises, it is very hard
to find a new job… It was only in the second week that I went into town to look for a
job. Looking for a job, in reality, meant waiting for clients on the city’s sidewalks, as the
only thing I could do was paint apartments. A friend who was also looking for work in
this way told me to come with him and that is what I did. That day, no-one offered us
work, we waited in vain and we went home in the evening having spent money on food
and transport. The next day we went to wait in another area, someone came along and
offered us work for a day...”27.
35 The sociological scope of the non-valorisation of human capital in the determination of
the income of xiagang employees is important. The social belief in the ability to improve
one’s income thanks to the accumulation of human capital and one’s personal efforts
constitutes an important condition for social mobility. But in a situation where human
capital is not valued, individuals have a tendency to look for societal or political causes,
and not individual ones, to explain the difficulties they find themselves in.
The impact on social identification
36 In our survey, only 1.1% of xiagang perceive themselves as belonging to the higher or
lower “upper” classes, 3.5% think they are part of the “upper middle” class and 15.7%
believe they are “lower middle” class. Finally, 35.2% consider themselves to be part of
the higher fringes of  the lowest rungs on the social  ladder,  while 44.5% think they
belong to the most disadvantaged social groups. What are the factors that determine
the social identification of the xiagang?
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3 Class identification among the xiagang
NB: The asterisks indicate the degree of signiﬁcance, with three asterisks corresponding to the
maximum degree (*** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; *P<0.05). 
The results were obtained using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model.
(1) Reference group: no vocational training.
(2) Reference group: other personnel. This group includes the personnel in administration and the
public utility companies afﬁliated to the enterprise.
37 The factors that exert a significant influence on the class identification of the xiagang
are in particular “the monthly salary following redundancy” and “the monthly salary
of the spouse” (see Table 3). Length of studies has lost its explanatory power. Certainly,
holders of higher diplomas more easily consider themselves part of a higher social class
than people without training, but the importance of this group is minor among xiagang.
38 Models 2 and 3 test the social identification of male xiagang. Setting aside the variable
relating to the professional situation of their spouse, it is the monthly salary following
redundancy that constitutes the independent variable with the greatest explanatory
power. In the second case, where two new independent variables are introduced, that is
years that the spouse has spent in education and the monthly salary of the spouse, the
impact of the former is imperceptible while that of the latter is highly significant from
a statistical point of view.
39 Models 4 and 5 analyse the social identification of female xiagang. Model 4 shows that
the independent variables with the strongest explanatory power are the monthly salary
following  redundancy  and  the  number  of  years  of  study.  In  Model  5,  we  have
introduced two new variables, these are the education level and the monthly salary of
the spouse, which put into context the explanatory importance of the education level
variable. The social identification of the wives is sharply determined by the income of
their husbands. 
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40 Models  6  and  7  allow  a  comparison  of  the  determining  factors  in  the  social
identification of the 20 to 40 age bracket and that of the 41 to 55 age bracket. The
xiagang aged between 41 and 55, who had to stop their studies as a result of being sent
to the countryside during the Cultural  Revolution,  have a  weak evaluation of  their
social position in comparison with the “others” reference group or technicians. This
phenomenon is not as pronounced in the 20 to 40 age bracket.
41 From these models, we can conclude that among the xiagang, whether male or female,
the  primary  factors  that  determine  social  identification  are  the  monthly  salary
following redundancy and the monthly income of the spouse. A notable difference is
found, however, for women, who identify themselves more through the income that
their spouse earns. Human capital, in terms of education level, generally exerts only a
minor  influence.  The  loss  of  explanatory power  held  by  human  capital  in  social
identification  is,  moreover,  more  marked  among individuals  whose  income is  on  a
downward curve, that is for xiagang in the 41 to 55 age bracket.
Impact on social behaviour
42 In general terms, it is assessed that the higher the age and the education level of an
individual, the more he will have a tendency to exercise a rational pattern of social
behaviour and to avoid violence. However, for the xiagang, these factors are played out
differently as a result of the downward income curve. We define “social behaviour” as
an independent variable expressed through a combination of sub-variables (recourse—
or not—to collective petition, opinions relating to social justice, to relations between
the cadres and the population, to local economic prosperity, to the resolution of the
question of the xiagang mainly). We call this combination of variables the coefficient of
social instability. 
 
4 Social instability coefficient
NB: The asterisks indicate the degree of signiﬁcance, with three asterisks corresponding to the
maximum degree (*** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; *P<0.05).
43 In Model 1 of Table 4, sex and membership of the Party do not have a significant impact
on the social instability coefficient. On the other hand, the variables such as age, social
identification,  the monthly salary following redundancy,  years  of  study and weekly
hours of work exert a major influence. In contrast to the common understanding, the
older  a  xiagang is  and  the  longer  his  vocational  training,  the  higher  is  his  social
instability coefficient, that is the stronger his discontent towards society is and the
more he is inclined to exhibit violent patterns of behaviour. Social identification is the
most powerful explanatory factor. This result reinforces the relationship that we have
established between non-valorisation in human capital and social identification.
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44 Models 2 and 3 of Table 4 underline the differences in the social instability coefficient
between  the  generations.  For  the  41  to  55  age  bracket  who are  experiencing  a
particularly significant lack of valorisation of human capital, the social identification
variable  also  has  the  greatest  impact  on  the  social  instability  coefficient,  and  the
number of years spent studying only serves to aggravate this coefficient. 
45 For a given income level, the longer the vocational training an individual has received
and the older he is, the more sensitive he will be to the inequality in income. And he
will pay even more attention to this when his own path is on a downward slope, hence
the greater probability that he will exhibit violent behavioural patterns and participate
in  collective  actions.  It  is  thus  the  relatively  older  xiagang who  were  sent  to  the
countryside during the Cultural Revolution who are most in need of aid.
Vocational training in order to change work or trade?
46 The  problem  of  the  reintegration  of  the  xiagang  is  a  consequence  of  the  complete
transformation of the structures of production, marked by a contraction of traditional
industries and by a surging expansion of new ones. These developments bring with
them a change in the evaluation of professional skills and experience on the labour
market, which translates, for certain people, into a loss or lack of valorisation of the
human capital that they hold. For this reason, it is important that a xiagang can pursue
vocational training courses so that he is able to change work or trade and thus link up
again  with the  chain in  which human capital  is  accumulated.  The  xiagang must  be
enabled to transform and renew their know-how and their technical skills so that they
can  better  respond  to  market  demand.  Such  a  policy  thus  constitutes  an  effective
solution that  can help them overcome their  difficulties.  In  this  respect,  our survey
shows that  workers  who  have  undergone  training  with  a  view  to  furthering  their
professional rehabilitation have a greater chance of finding a new job with a decent
income.
47 The statistical results of our survey also demonstrate that workers who have followed
this kind of training have already experienced a certain improvement in their living
conditions. Table 5 reports on two questions that clarify the differences between the
xiagang who have following a training course and those who have not. To the question
“How has your standard of living developed over the last five years?”, the responses
indicating an improvement are relatively high and those indicating a deterioration are
relatively low for those who have undergone training. Vocational training is thus a
relatively positive factor in the life of a xiagang and his family.
48 To the question “What differences are there between your current income compared
you’re your income before you lost your job?”, the responses do not reveal any major
difference between those workers who have followed vocational training courses and
those who have not among those whose current income is higher than the one they
received before the period of unemployment. In contrast, among those whose income is
identical or lower, the differences are noteworthy. The income following redundancy is
thus slightly higher among those who have followed vocational training courses.
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5  Usefulness of vocational training courses aiming at the reintegration of the xiagang
49 Vocational training courses as a means to promote and reinforce work skills are offered
and demonstrated as an example, but they are not of a compulsory character. It is up to
the xiagang themselves whether they choose to participate or not. The courses which
aim  to  improve  their  skills  are,  however,  perceived  by  local  governments  and  the
xiagang as  less  important  than  “social  welfare”  ( shenghuo  butie).  Nevertheless,  the
results of our survey reveal that vocational training represents a more effective aid
than  the  simple  granting  of  social  welfare. These  social  security  benefits  resolve
immediate problems and help the recipients out of poverty, but the chances of them
falling below the poverty line again are very high.
50 The  non-valorisation  of  human  capital  equates  with  the  social  behaviour  and
identification of the xiagang. Individuals whose human capital is no longer recognised
or valued are inclined to believe that neither their income nor their social position are
determined by their level of competence and the efforts they have made but are, in
contrast,  determined  by  social  factors.  Thus,  those  who  have  a  relatively  elevated
human capital have a tendency to develop a stronger discontent towards society (shehui
buman).  In  other words,  these are not  the poorest  people,  but  they come from the
disadvantaged groups whose non-valorisation of human capital is the most marked. If
the linkages in the accumulation of human capital were restored, this could again be
exploited.  In  the  opposite  case,  this  accumulated  capital  represents,  in  contrast,  a
burden that can cripple the future of the individuals in question. 
51 Our survey suggests that a section of the xiagang is in the process of radically changing
their behaviour with regard to society. They no longer look for support to the policies
put in place for their benefit, but believe that they will succeed in changing their lives
through their  own efforts  and personal  choices.  It  is  precisely  these  people  whose
professional  prospects  are  developing  positively.  This  also  means  that,  thanks  to
countless individual actions, the mechanisms of mobility and social climbing are in the
process of  a transformation that will  allow the creation of  new social  structures in
production and labour. 
52 The living standards and the income level of the xiagang is comparable with that of the
rural  migrants in the cities,  but,  different from the xiagang, the latter benefit  from
tendential  growth in their  income marked by a  positive effect  of  human capital.  It
follows from that that their perception of the future is positive. In contrast, the xiagang,
as a result of the downward trend in their income and the weakness of their human
capital, experience their difficulties particularly sharply. However, the changes taking
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place may help them move from a vision of history determined by social factors to one
that leaves more space for individual choice. Many of them belonging to the generation
that was dispatched to the countryside have succeeded in transforming this traumatic
experience  into  a  positive  value  added  to  their  human  capital  and  have  become
important players in different professions or sectors.  We would like to believe that
many of the xiagang workers will be able to find a solution to their current problems.
53 Because the organisation of labour was implemented for a long time by the state, the
xiagang today often feel completely powerless in the face of the new modus operandi of
the economy. Faced with possibilities of social mobility or new job opportunities, the
xiagang often only perceive their lack of competitiveness. The aid granted to the xiagang
within a judicial and regulatory framework in the form of compensation and subsidies
is, of course, very important, for it allows the difficulties which they have to face every
day to be alleviated. The vocational training courses that are organised should include
the aim of helping them to improve their ability to choose and to link up again the
chains in which human capital is accumulated. Unfortunately, in many of the training
centres, this objective is only formal, and the assistance given in the search for re-
employment takes the form of the old “central planning” (danwei anpai).
54 We should realise, however, that, in a context of far-reaching mutations in the relations
between  the  state,  the  market  and  society,  the  individual  has  greater  choice  and
possibilities of adapting. Targeted vocational training courses allowing the xiagang to
enhance their  human capital  and to  reinforce  their  abilities  to  choose,  in  order  to
permit them thus to be adapt more suitably to the conditions on the labour market,
represent the most effective means of assisting them. Indeed, the usefulness of these
training courses and of professional reintegration has been proved on a very large scale
in the framework of other experiences abroad, as has the importance of enhancing
human capital in order to rapidly reduce poverty and to prevent a relapse.
55 To achieve this goal, it is necessary on the one hand to increase the proportion allotted
to training expenses in the overall aid budgets intended for the xiagang,  and on the
other to improve their effectiveness by, for example, making public tenders and also
encouraging the participation of intermediaries in civil society. The rate of professional
reintegration should from now on be one of the criteria for evaluating the return on
the investments in training. This kind of training policy as a priority means of aiding
the xiagang should also be based on accompanying measures that could include benefits
granted to people setting up a business, such as tax relief, facilities for accessing small
loans,  simplification  of  administrative  procedures,  and  so  on.  A  few  years  ago  we
adopted  several  incentive  policies  to  encourage  the  enrichment  of  a  part  of  the
population;  today,  it  is  even  more  legitimate  to  adopt  policies  to  help  people  in
difficulty.
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